The Unstoppable(!) “IDF Strategy” Crumbled in the War With Hamas and Iran

Israel’s offensive-driven security doctrine is primarily based on the document titled “IDF Strategy,” authored in 2015 by then-Chief of the General Staff, Major General Gadi Eisenkot. This strategy, designed as a multilayered and perpetual warfare doctrine to confront both state and non-state actors, will be analyzed in this article in terms of its application and level of success in the ongoing war involving Hamas, Iran, and its proxy force Hezbollah.

Israel’s Military Strategy

The Israeli Defense Strategy is structured around the elimination of non-state actors such as Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and Hezbollah, who struggle for the liberation of occupied Palestinian territories and the establishment of an independent Palestinian state. Furthermore, the strategy aims at subjugating and, when deemed appropriate, dismantling existing states in the so-called “Promised Land.” Although labeled a “defense strategy,” it is, in practice, a policy of continuous aggression—designed to instill fear across the region and to promote a climate in which no state feels secure. Thus, it manifests as a form of regional state terrorism.

The IDF Strategy, which shapes Israel’s security policies and institutions, rests on four core principles:

• Deterrence: Demonstrating strong military capability and resolving severe costs on adversaries, thereby deterring potential attacks or resistance.
• Early Warning: Utilizing superior intelligence—primarily through Mossad and Shin Bet—and advanced technological surveillance systems to detect threats preemptively.
• Offensive Posture: Preferring preemptive or retaliatory operations that eliminate threats at their source, as opposed to a passive defensive stance.
• Decisiveness: Achieving swift and conclusive outcomes in conflicts to avoid prolonged wars.

The IDF Strategy adopts a multilayered security approach designed to neutralize threats and achieve strategic objectives. It is configured for simultaneous, multi-domain operations—air, land, sea, and cyber—across multiple fronts. The offensive dimension of this strategy consists of rapid, high-intensity, and, when necessary, tens of thousands of simultaneous surprise attacks on enemy decision-making centers.

The “Campaign Between Wars” (Mabam Strategy)

What distinguishes the IDF Strategy from other conventional military doctrines is its systematic reliance on the “Campaign Between Wars”—commonly known as the Mabam Strategy. This approach allows the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) to engage in constant low-intensity warfare, even in the absence of open conflict. Its aims include the prevention of future wars, enhancement of deterrence, securing operational superiority, and the gradual degradation of enemy capabilities.

This so-called "peacetime" low-intensity warfare involves targeted airstrikes, assassinations, sabotage, cyber operations, and intelligence interventions—often conducted on the sovereign territories of other states. The “warfare without war” doctrine, in this form, stands in clear violation of international law.

Another key component of the IDF Strategy is the Dahiya Doctrine, developed following the 2006 Lebanon War. This doctrine advocates the use of disproportionate force against both military and civilian infrastructure in enemy territories to inflict maximum damage and thereby erode public support for hostile actors.

The continuation of this analysis will further explore the operational limitations and strategic failures Israel has encountered when attempting to implement this doctrine against a coordinated axis of resistance composed of Hamas, Iran, and Hezbollah.

The IDF Strategy Collapsed in the Face of Hamas

The attack launched by Hamas on October 7, 2023—referred to as the “Al-Aqsa Flood”—constituted an operation that fundamentally dismantled the Israeli Defense Forces’ (IDF) core strategic doctrine. Despite maintaining a blockade on Gaza since 2006, Israel suffered an unprecedented surprise assault and heavy casualties, which have widely been interpreted by security experts as a “strategic failure.” The Deterrence pillar of the IDF Strategy proved ineffective against Hamas, while the glaring intelligence failures revealed that the much-vaunted Early Warning systems did not function as claimed. Since October 7, the search for those responsible for this security lapse continues, fueling deep tensions and mistrust between Prime Minister Netanyahu and Israel’s military-intelligence establishment.

On that day, Hamas was able to breach the so-called “smart wall” surrounding Gaza—constructed with over one billion dollars in investment and equipped with advanced technologies such as radars, automated machine guns, and thermal cameras. The Qassam Brigades, the military wing of Hamas, infiltrated through 22 different points, successfully capturing hundreds of Israeli hostages. The Israeli army, caught off guard and unable to maintain its command structure, resorted to activating the notorious “Hannibal Directive,” resulting in the deaths of hundreds of its own citizens through indiscriminate tank and helicopter fire.

It became evident that Hamas had thoroughly deconstructed the IDF’s military doctrine, penetrated Israeli intelligence, and effectively neutralized units responsible for constant alertness and early detection—leaving Israel vulnerable at its core. The nature and scope of the attack underscored the Israeli military’s underestimation of Hamas’s capabilities and its arrogant misreading of the enemy.

Staggered by the shock of these initial blows, Israel was only able to regain composure with massive support from the United States and other Western allies—who provided direct military, intelligence, and political assistance.

However, despite such extensive external backing—including the active participation of foreign intelligence services and military personnel—the Israeli army failed to enter Hamas’s tunnel networks, rescue hostages, or break the resistance. Apart from launching massive aerial bombardments resulting in the deaths of tens of thousands of civilians, leveling residential areas, and weaponizing starvation, the IDF could not demonstrate a concrete military achievement. Outside of battlefield casualties, Israel was unable to eliminate Hamas’s leadership in Gaza through targeted assassinations, nor did it succeed in penetrating Hamas’s disciplined internal command structure through intelligence leaks.

The Israeli Defense Strategy, which relies on combining warfare with diplomacy and justifying every illegal act under the guise of “self-defense” to gain international impunity, collapsed after October 7. The scale of atrocities committed by Israel led numerous states and global public opinion to label the country as a genocidal rogue state, severely isolating it on the international stage. The issuance of an International Criminal Court (ICC) arrest warrant for Prime Minister Netanyahu marked a profoundly humiliating defeat for Israel on the diplomatic front.

Israel’s Mabam Strategy Failed to Deter Hamas—and Was Strategically Turned Against It

Israel’s so-called Mabam Strategy (Campaign Between Wars) failed to achieve deterrence against Hamas; in fact, it was strategically reversed and used against Israel with calculated precision. Built around the principle of preemptive action and known for its proactive, offensive doctrine, Israel was itself subjected—on its own territory—to a coordinated onslaught of “rapid, intense, and simultaneous attacks” on October 7. Cyber operations and intelligence-based deception tactics, typically employed by Israel to disorient its adversaries, proved ineffective against Hamas. Instead, it became clear that Israel had been misled through cyber deception and infiltrated through its intelligence networks in the lead-up to the attack.

Israel, which treats high-precision, targeted assassinations—often framed as “surgical strikes”—as a core component of its military doctrine, suffered an unprecedented blow when senior state officials were captured in their homes by members of Hamas’s Qassam Brigades. These events marked a profound failure of both strategy and operational security.

The ultimate goal of any war strategy is not merely to destroy the enemy’s physical power but to break its will to resist—to psychologically subdue it. The widespread dissemination of the October 7 attacks via video footage, live broadcasts, and social media triggered mass feelings of fear, helplessness, and rage among the Israeli public. The long-standing perception of the “invincibility of the IDF” collapsed.

Hamas’s prisoner-taking strategy was executed with remarkable success, causing deep psychological distress and strategic confusion on the Israeli side. The resulting disintegration of morale led to mass protests demanding a ceasefire and the resignation of the Netanyahu government. These demonstrations persist, and both the government and the Knesset remain in a state of deep political instability.

Despite months of devastating warfare, the people of Gaza have not abandoned their land, even in the face of mass killings and inhumane treatment. Hamas managed to rapidly replenish its military ranks, while it was the Israeli public—not the Palestinians—who suffered psychological breakdowns. Fatigue and demoralization took hold among both Israeli soldiers and civilians. Many reservists began refusing to report for duty. A severe crisis of trust emerged between the Israeli government, military, and intelligence institutions.

The depletion of missile stockpiles, urgent need for renewal of aircraft and helicopter fleets, skyrocketing war expenditures, and escalating economic crisis rendered the continuation of the war unsustainable for Israel. These developments also had ripple effects on Jewish diaspora communities, many of whom found themselves increasingly marginalized in their host countries due to the actions of the Israeli state.

The IDF’s Mabam Strategy Succeeded Against Hezbollah

Although the IDF Strategy failed to yield results against Hamas, it was implemented with notable success against the first pillar of the Axis of Resistance: Hezbollah.

On September 17, 2024, pager-type devices used by Hezbollah operatives were detonated in southern Lebanon, followed by walkie-talkie-type radios on September 18. These explosions, carried out by Israeli intelligence, resulted in the deaths of 42 Hezbollah members and left nearly 4,000 severely injured. Through targeted operations, Israel eliminated senior Hezbollah leadership, including Hassan Nasrallah, and succeeded in airstrikes aimed at destroying missile depots across Lebanon. These attacks devastated morale, disrupted the group’s organizational hierarchy, and paralyzed its communication networks. Despite possessing tens of thousands of rockets and thousands of fighters, Hezbollah was unable to mount a meaningful response against Israel. Consequently, Iran’s foremost and foundational Axis of Resistance collapsed.

Israel’s Mabam Strategy, which involves electronic sabotage, cyber intelligence, targeted assassinations, and psychological warfare through “rapid, intense, and simultaneous strikes,” proved fully effective in all its dimensions against Hezbollah. The humiliation experienced by the IDF and Israeli intelligence agencies during the Hamas attacks of October 7 was, in part, counterbalanced by these successful operations against Hezbollah.

The Effectiveness and Vulnerability of the IDF Strategy in the Israel-Iran War

Having failed to achieve its objectives in Gaza against Hamas and facing deepening internal political crises, the Netanyahu government was left with few options. In a last-ditch effort to preserve his political power, Netanyahu sought to pull the United States directly into the war and transform it into a broader American conflict. He thus initiated an attack on Iran.

On June 13, Israel launched a large-scale air operation involving 200 aircraft—including F-35I, F-15I, and F-35 fighter jets—and numerous unmanned aerial vehicles. Flying at low altitudes, Israeli aircraft exploited electronic warfare to blind Iran’s air defense systems, rendering its radars and missile launchers inoperative. Precision strikes against pre-identified targets killed 30 senior Iranian generals, including the Chief of General Staff and commanders of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), as well as 11 nuclear scientists. Military and nuclear installations across the country were bombed. The scale of the attack, and Iran’s lack of preparedness, exposed a staggering level of vulnerability.

This debacle was largely attributed to Iran’s dual military structure. While the Artesh (regular armed forces) is officially responsible for national defense, it suffers from outdated equipment and limited budgets. The IRGC, answerable only to the Supreme Leader, is active in internal security, external operations, and in supporting regional proxy groups such as Hezbollah, Hamas, and the Houthis. Iran’s prewar arsenal of over 3,000 ballistic missiles and numerous UAVs were primarily under IRGC control.

The war revealed severe rivalry and lack of coordination between the Artesh and the IRGC. For 12 days, Israeli fighter jets—some traveling over 1,500 kilometers—had uncontested control of Iranian airspace, while no Iranian aircraft took flight. The Artesh failed to protect national airspace, but more troubling was the revelation that key drone attacks were executed from within Iran, assisted by infiltrated agents and local collaborators. Israel’s long-standing covert operations in Iran allowed it to penetrate security structures, gain access to sensitive information, and facilitate target acquisition. In these operations, drone manufacturing facilities were destroyed, and numerous drones seized. Over 700 individuals were arrested on suspicion of collaborating with Mossad. Iran, in effect, had become a security free zone.

While Iran’s domestic defense structures were collapsing, its much-vaunted Axis of Resistance—built over four decades in Lebanon, Iraq, and Yemen—failed to mobilize in defense of Iran. These groups had been designed as forward resistance fronts in case of an attack on Iran. Yet, when the moment arrived, they failed to deliver the expected deterrence. Thus, this component of Iran’s defense doctrine also collapsed.

In conclusion, Iran’s security institutions failed to deconstruct or effectively respond to the IDF’s defense strategy. Whether due to strategic miscalculations or an overconfidence in presumed immunity from attack, Iran’s defensive posture proved grossly inadequate.

Nevertheless, Iran managed to achieve notable retaliatory success against Israel. It launched approximately 591 ballistic missiles and over 1,000 unmanned aerial vehicles.

The Limits of Israel’s Missile Defense Systems

To counter Iran’s retaliatory strikes, Israel deployed its multi-layered air defense system, consisting of:

• Iron Dome: for short-range rockets and projectiles
• David’s Sling: for medium-range threats
• Arrow System: for long-range ballistic missiles

This system was further reinforced by the U.S.-supplied THAAD batteries for high-altitude ballistic missile interception and SM-3 and SM-6 interceptors launched from U.S. naval vessels.

However, as Iran began using more advanced Shahed-136 drones and next-generation ballistic missiles, Israel’s Iron Dome became increasingly ineffective, with interception success rates dropping to 65%. Designed primarily for short-range threats, Iron Dome struggled against Iran’s high-speed, precision-guided munitions. Strategic targets in Tel Aviv, Haifa, Ramat Gan, and Be’er Sheva were struck, and critical sites such as F-35 hangars at Nevatim Airbase sustained significant damage. According to Israeli sources, the financial toll of these missile strikes exceeded $3 billion.

The David’s Sling system, using Stunner missiles, saw intensive use—firing approximately 100 interceptors—with a success rate around 75%. However, these munitions are entirely dependent on U.S. resupply.

The war exposed Israel’s lack of sufficient protection against high-altitude ballistic missiles. Stocks of Arrow 2/3 interceptors fell to critical levels. Like the Stunner, replenishing Arrow systems also requires U.S. assistance.

The United States deployed one of its seven THAAD batteries to Israel on October 13, 2024. During Iran’s ballistic missile campaign, this system was activated and fired between 60 and 80 interceptors. Roughly 15–20% of the global THAAD inventory was expended in 12 days, at a cost of $800 million. Given that Lockheed Martin only produces 50–60 THAAD missiles annually, this war has imposed a substantial logistical and financial burden on the United States.

In addition, U.S. Navy destroyers actively used SM-3 and SM-6 interceptors against Iranian missiles. The rapid depletion of these munitions caused strategic alarm within the Pentagon, especially given the existing procurement challenges.

Crucially, 90% of the rare earth elements (REEs) used in the production of these U.S. missiles are imported from China. Without these materials, manufacturing is impossible. Since December 2024, China has imposed export restrictions on REEs to the United States, severely slowing the production of missiles and precision-guided munitions. Due to the U.S. military’s extensive aid to Ukraine and Israel, stocks of key weapons such as Patriot, Tomahawk, and others are now on the brink of exhaustion.

While Israel faces the imminent risk of depleting its interceptor missile inventory without the capacity for swift replenishment, Iran is still believed to possess a reserve of approximately 2,000 ballistic missiles.

Conclusion

As outlined above, the much-vaunted Israeli Defense Strategy was successfully deciphered, reversed, and effectively applied against Israel by Hamas. Despite committing widespread atrocities, the principle of deterrence within the IDF Strategy failed to break the will of the people of Gaza. Instead, the prolonged war and its mounting costs backfired, leading to public exhaustion within Israeli society. While military reservists resisted conscription, wealthier segments of the population fled the country. In the face of Hamas’s resilience and ideological commitment, deterrence proved ineffective.

Although Israel had infiltrated Iran and its proxy networks in line with the principle of early warning, successfully rendering these entities operationally vulnerable, Hamas’s disciplined structure prevented such breaches. On the contrary, the October 7 attack demonstrated that Hamas had penetrated Israeli state infrastructure, executed cyber operations, and managed to lull Israeli intelligence into complacency.

By capturing hundreds of Israelis and bringing them to Gaza to use as bargaining tools to end the occupation, Hamas showed it had mastered proactive defense and preemptive attack at a level comparable to, if not exceeding, the Israeli state.

The IDF, whose doctrine is centered on achieving rapid and decisive outcomes and avoiding prolonged wars, has grown weary and demoralized in the face of Hamas’s protracted war strategy. The command echelon has reportedly lost hope of a clear military victory. Hamas, through its use of tunnel warfare, proved unmanageable. By avoiding digital communication and high-tech infrastructure, Hamas rendered Israel’s most sophisticated cyber operations ineffective.

Operating within a narrow 45 km² area and primarily underground, Hamas presented a rare example of a vastly inferior force reversing and neutralizing the superior enemy’s strategy.

Meanwhile, Iran, despite disappointing its population with its initial passivity in defense, managed to expose the vulnerabilities of Israel’s defense systems through a series of successful ballistic missile and UAV strikes. Critical facilities were severely damaged: the Mossad headquarters and the Israeli Military Intelligence Directorate (AMAN) in Tel Aviv were hit by ballistic missiles, and the Mossad command center in Herzliya was flattened, shattering the agency’s once-mythical reputation.

Within the first nine days of war, 24 Israelis were killed, over 1,200 wounded, more than 25,000 buildings destroyed, and 8,000 people displaced. In a matter of days, Israeli cities began to resemble the ruins of Gaza.

The Iron Dome system, widely regarded as a symbol of Israeli invincibility, became the so-called “Leaky Dome”, unable to intercept Iran’s advanced projectiles. Missile stockpiles were depleted, and Israel became dependent on U.S. resupply. Israeli Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich announced that the 12-day war with Iran had cost Israel approximately $12 billion. The Bank of Israel had previously estimated that the 2023–2025 economic impact of war could reach $70 billion. With the Iran conflict, this burden grew. Over the next decade, the war’s indirect consequences—including reduced foreign investment, labor market disruptions, and decreased productivity—could bring Israel’s total economic losses to around $400 billion.

Dependent on U.S. aid for both survival and warfighting, Israel was compelled to secure $17 billion in emergency American aid during 2023–2024 and has already requested an additional $10 billion in bridge funding for 2025.

On Sunday, June 22, former U.S. President Donald Trump halted the war by launching a coordinated strike on three Iranian nuclear facilities. This action extricated both states from their respective quagmires—for the time being. By becoming the first U.S. president to directly involve his country militarily on behalf of Israel, Trump solidified his authority over the Zionist lobby both within Israel and the United States.

Israel has now become—militarily, politically, and morally—a burden from which the Western world increasingly seeks to unshackle itself. The growing global support for a two-state solution is expected to pressure Israel back to its pre-1967 borders…