Makkah Defence Pact: Will Pakistan and Türkiye Go to War to Defend Saudi Arabia?

The growing military activity of the Houthis in Yemen and the emerging security threats facing Saudi Arabia have once again placed the Makkah Agreement, signed by Türkiye, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia on 7 August, at the centre of international attention. The question is no longer simply what the political significance of the agreement is. The more fundamental question is whether Pakistan and Türkiye would actually be prepared to deploy troops to defend Saudi Arabia if armed attacks against the kingdom were to intensify.

The most significant provision of the Makkah Agreement is that an armed attack against any one of the three countries will be regarded as an attack against all three. On the face of it, this provision binds the three states together in a collective defence framework and can be viewed as a response to the rapidly changing security environment in the region. Yet the real test of international agreements does not lie in the strength of their language, but in what happens when that language has to be translated into concrete decisions.

That is precisely the stage now confronting Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Türkiye.

The Houthi attacks on Saudi Arabia, the increasingly fragile security situation in the Red Sea, and the Houthis’ control of Mayyun Island, a strategically important island at the entrance to the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, have added further strategic weight to the crisis. Bab el-Mandeb is not merely a geographical chokepoint. It is one of the world’s critical maritime passages, linking the Red Sea with the Gulf of Aden and, indirectly, the Indian Ocean. Prolonged instability along this route would not remain confined to Saudi Arabia or Yemen; it could also disrupt global trade, energy shipments and regional economies.

For this reason, the collective defence provision of the Makkah Agreement cannot be viewed simply as a mutual defence commitment between three countries. Behind it lie the changing balance of power in the Middle East, the security of Saudi Arabia, the Yemen crisis, commercial shipping through the Red Sea, as well as the national interests of Türkiye and Pakistan themselves.

Yet the most complicated question is that of Türkiye.

Türkiye has so far given no indication that it intends to participate in any direct military operation against the Houthis. Ankara did condemn the Houthis’ recent actions on 8 September, but its official stance since then has remained cautious, suggesting that it does not currently wish to become an active military party to the conflict in Yemen.

Such caution is hardly surprising. On the one hand, Türkiye attaches considerable importance to its increasingly close relationship with Saudi Arabia. On the other, Ankara has little interest in becoming entangled in a military conflict whose consequences could affect its economy, foreign policy and domestic politics for years to come.

A particularly significant remark came from Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan, who said that the collective defence provision of the Makkah Agreement is technically similar to Article 5 of the NATO treaty. However, he did not make clear whether the provision would automatically require military intervention in the event of an attack on one of the member states.

This is precisely where the distinction between the political language of the agreement and an actual military obligation becomes apparent.

Treating an attack on one country as an attack on all three certainly represents a strong political commitment. It does not, however, necessarily mean that all three countries would deploy their armed forces in every circumstance. The nature and scale of any response would depend on the type and intensity of the attack, where it occurred, the national security interests at stake and the political decisions taken by the respective governments.

For Türkiye, the issue is even more sensitive. Ankara seeks to strengthen its regional influence through mediation, diplomacy and defence cooperation, rather than presenting itself as a country that intervenes militarily in every regional crisis. Entering the war against the Houthis would therefore represent a significant departure from this approach.

There is also the question of the economic burden. Türkiye’s economy may find it difficult to absorb the additional costs of a prolonged war. Economic ties, investment, trade and defence cooperation between Türkiye and Saudi Arabia are becoming increasingly important. For Ankara, a more practical course may therefore be to strengthen Saudi Arabia through defence technology, drones, air-defence systems and other military equipment rather than deploying Turkish troops to the highly complex Yemeni theatre.

Such an approach would allow Türkiye to remain committed to the broader spirit of the agreement while avoiding the risks associated with direct involvement in the war.

Pakistan, however, faces a different situation.

Relations between Saudi Arabia and Pakistan are not merely diplomatic or economic. They are rooted in a deep strategic partnership that has developed over several decades. The two countries have a long history of defence cooperation, while Saudi Arabia has provided financial assistance to Pakistan during a number of difficult periods. Given Pakistan’s current economic circumstances, these ties have acquired even greater importance for Islamabad.

That is why, if Saudi Arabia were to face a major and direct threat as a result of Houthi attacks, and Riyadh were to formally seek the activation of the collective defence provision of the Makkah Agreement, it would not be easy for Pakistan simply to refuse.

At the same time, it would be premature to conclude that Pakistan would necessarily send troops to Yemen. Pakistan has made clear in the past that it attaches great importance to the security of Saudi Arabia, but it has also recognised that direct participation in a foreign war would constitute an extremely sensitive political and military decision. The Pakistani government would have to balance its historic relationship with Saudi Arabia against domestic political considerations, regional security concerns and its own military priorities.

Nevertheless, one reality cannot be ignored: if Saudi territory were to come under a large-scale and direct threat, political and diplomatic pressure on Pakistan would undoubtedly increase.

The situation in Türkiye would be even more complicated. The government would have to take into account not only foreign-policy considerations but also domestic political opinion. A significant section of Turkish society might express solidarity with Saudi Arabia, but that would not necessarily mean support for Türkiye becoming involved in a prolonged and open-ended war. Opposition parties and left-wing political forces, in particular, could strongly resist any military intervention that turned Türkiye into a direct party to the conflict in Yemen.

For Ankara, therefore, the safest course may be to stand with Saudi Arabia without becoming directly involved in the war.

Türkiye could provide military assistance to Saudi Arabia through the growing capabilities of its defence industry. This would help meet Saudi Arabia’s defence requirements while simultaneously providing Türkiye’s defence sector with access to an important and influential market. In this sense, military cooperation could represent an economic and strategic opportunity for Türkiye rather than direct participation in a war.

Yet one fundamental question remains: if Houthi attacks were to become so severe that Saudi Arabia faced an extraordinary threat to its security, could Türkiye fulfil the spirit of the Makkah Agreement simply by providing weapons and defence assistance?

The answer is not yet clear.

Indeed, this is precisely where the real test of the Makkah Agreement lies. During peacetime, the language of defence agreements is invariably strong. But when war breaks out, every country must weigh its own national interests. For Saudi Arabia, the agreement represents a collective security guarantee; for Pakistan, it is a test of its historic and strategic relationship with the kingdom; while for Türkiye, it is a question of balancing its growing regional influence with a cautious foreign-policy approach.

The Houthi attacks on Saudi Arabia are undoubtedly an early test of the Makkah Agreement. If the attacks continue, the Houthis will be challenging not only Saudi Arabia’s defence capabilities but also the political credibility of the new security arrangement established among the three countries.

For Ankara, however, the wiser course may be to adopt a measured, step-by-step policy rather than respond emotionally. Supporting Saudi Arabia’s security, applying diplomatic pressure, expanding defence cooperation and providing advanced military technology are all avenues through which Türkiye can stand alongside its partner without becoming directly embroiled in a conflict from which withdrawal could prove extremely difficult.

For Pakistan, too, the more prudent course would be to balance its national interests with its responsibilities under the agreement rather than make decisions driven by emotion. Saudi Arabia’s security is important to Pakistan, but the nature, scope and duration of any military action would need to be determined with the utmost caution.

Ultimately, the success of the Makkah Agreement will not be measured by how quickly Pakistan or Türkiye sends troops to Saudi Arabia. Its real success will lie in whether the three countries can establish a collective defence mechanism capable of safeguarding Saudi Arabia’s security, regional stability and the safety of global trade, without simultaneously pushing the region towards a new and wider war.

Today, the Houthi attacks are no longer simply a question of Saudi Arabia’s defence. They have also become a test of the credibility of the Makkah Agreement, Pakistan’s strategic commitment and Türkiye’s regional strategy. The question for Pakistan is how far it will stand by its longstanding ally, while Türkiye faces an even more complicated challenge: how can it become part of Saudi Arabia’s defence without becoming a party to the war in Yemen?

The future of the Makkah Agreement may ultimately be determined not by a single military decision taken on a particular day, but by the cautious, coordinated and practical actions of the three capitals in the crises that lie ahead. If Türkiye continues to stand alongside Saudi Arabia through defence cooperation, while Pakistan provides political and military support, the spirit of the agreement may be preserved while also creating a path towards preventing a new regional war.

But if circumstances reach a point at which the words of the agreement can no longer remain on paper and must inevitably be translated into action on the battlefield, the world’s attention will turn to Islamabad and Ankara. At that moment, the real question will no longer be who signed the Makkah Agreement, but who stepped onto the battlefield when its most important provision was put to the test, who chose to provide support from behind the lines, and who maintained a distance from the war.

That will be the moment when the Makkah Agreement proves whether it can transcend the status of a diplomatic document and demonstrate its true strategic significance.

Dr. Furqan Hameed