Does the Global Firepower Index (GFP) Reflect Countries’ Actual Warfighting Capabilities? The Case of Israel

Whenever the possibility of conflict or war arises between states, the Global Firepower Index (GFP) rankings of the countries concerned are widely circulated in the media and used to compare their military strength. Generally, greater weight is given to the assumption that the country ranked higher is more likely to prevail, and analyses are often based on this assumption.

But does the GFP Index really provide accurate and sufficient information, as is commonly assumed? Do the realities on the battlefield necessarily correspond to the military capabilities reflected on paper?

This article examines the extent to which the GFP Index reflects actual military power, using Israel as a case study.

GFP: Ranking the Military Strength of 145 Countries

The Global Firepower Index (GFP), which ranks the military strength of 145 countries, has operated as a website since 2006 and annually ranks the military capabilities of the 145 countries included in its list. According to GFP, the ranking is not based solely on the number of military personnel or the defense budget; rather, it is calculated using a special formula that incorporates more than 60 individual factors and produces a “PowerIndex” (PwrIndx) score.

In this calculation, the closer the score is to zero, the greater the military strength is considered to be.

The ranking primarily draws on data provided by the CIA World Factbook, Wikipedia, and other open sources. These data are sometimes found to be outdated or inaccurate.

According to the 2026 Global Firepower ranking, the top 10 countries are as follows:[i]

The main criteria and categories determining the ranking are as follows:

• Personnel: Total population, military-age population, active, reserve, and paramilitary forces
• Military Inventory and Diversity of Weaponry: Air, land, and naval capabilities; tanks, aircraft, ships, artillery, etc.
• Defense Budget and Financial Resources: Defense spending, external debt, foreign exchange and gold reserves, PPP
• Logistics and Infrastructure: Airports, ports, merchant fleet, railways and roads
• Geographical Location
• Natural Resources: Oil production, consumption, and reserves
• Special Modifiers: Bonuses and penalties

The system applies special coefficients (bonuses and penalties) to prevent large but technologically backward armies from gaining an undue advantage in the ranking, while also reflecting the capabilities of smaller but technologically advanced forces.

Limitations of the Index

The greatest limitation of the Global Firepower Index is that it measures only the conventional (land, sea, and air) war potential of countries. The model is based on traditional parameters inherited from the Cold War era and focuses entirely on countries’ conventional warfighting capabilities. Non-conventional information related to defense is not included in this assessment.

AI-powered UAVs, swarming drones, or asymmetric cyber and electronic warfare capabilities, which have fundamentally changed the concept of warfare, are not reflected in the ranking. The Index also provides no information on the “technological quality” of the systems available to armed forces.

Countries’ nuclear weapons stockpiles, superiority in cyberspace, and space-based satellite and intelligence networks are not included in the scoring.

The Index, which compiles and ranks open-source data, also does not examine projects and capabilities that states possess and keep classified as national security secrets, even though these may affect the outcome of a war.

GFP provides an indication of a country’s overall industrial potential and a rough inventory of its major military assets.

Apart from these, other factors that directly affect states’ warfighting capabilities but are not included in the Index can be listed as follows:

The Force-Multiplier Effect of Military Alliances Is Not Taken into Account

The Global Firepower Index treats each country as an individual actor; rather than geopolitical balances or international relations, it focuses entirely on national geographic, demographic, economic, and conventional military capabilities. The impact of countries’ alliances, such as NATO, their rivalries, or changes in their alliances is not taken into account in the “PowerIndex” score.

Yet military alliances provide an allied state with additional deterrence on the one hand and the ability to benefit from the alliance’s forces and inventory on the other, thereby creating a force-multiplier effect for countries with lower scores. This important factor is overlooked.

It Provides No Information on Military Doctrine

GFP provides no information or analysis on the strategic doctrines according to which countries structure their air, land, or naval forces. For example, while it provides the inventory of a country’s naval forces, it does not indicate whether the navy has been built with the aim of becoming a global power capable of operating on the high seas or merely for coastal defense. Whether a country’s defense strategy is based on deterrence, offensive operations, or asymmetric defense is not taken into account.

Budgetary Information Is Not Categorized

GFP does not provide information on how defense budgets are allocated. There is no classification showing whether expenditure is directed toward R&D, personnel salaries, or heavy weaponry. Therefore, it is difficult to form an assessment of the military objectives toward which a country’s budget is being used.

The Source of the Weapons in a Military Inventory Is Not Specified

GFP also provides no information on the source of the weapons in a military’s inventory. Yet self-sufficiency is vital to a military’s warfighting and war-sustaining capabilities, particularly in terms of its dependence on other countries for weapons, ammunition, and spare parts.

Many of the 145 countries included in the Index are not self-sufficient and remain directly dependent on global suppliers such as the United States, Russia, China, and Western Europe for the procurement and production of main battle tanks, fighter aircraft, advanced air defense systems, and precision-guided munitions. An embargo imposed on countries that lack self-sufficiency, or disruptions in their supply routes, can directly and negatively affect their military power.

Inventory Losses Are Not Taken into Account

The Global Firepower Index does not take battlefield losses into account in real time. Instead, it reflects static assessments based on official inventory data and standardized coefficients, updating them at annual intervals. Tanks destroyed, aircraft shot down, or ships sunk during ongoing conflicts are not immediately reflected in the system.

Vehicles left to rot in hangars remain on the books despite being unusable due to sanctions, supply-chain disruptions, or a lack of spare parts may therefore make the available data misleading.

Government–Military Alignment

GFP has no mechanism for measuring psychological, sociological, or political factors. Critical factors that can directly affect the outcome of a war—such as tensions in civil-military relations, purges within the chain of command, or the military’s loyalty to the government—are not included in the report. Whether the government and military leadership agree on the objectives of the war, whether there are disagreements between the military and the political leadership, or whether there are crises of confidence is not reflected in the data.

The Health Infrastructure of the Military and Society

GFP counts manpower only in terms of the “total population available for military service” and the number of active and reserve personnel; it does not consider the military’s capacity to manage human casualties, its healthcare infrastructure, or the mental and physical health of its personnel. Factors that cannot be readily expressed through quantitative data—such as soldiers’ morale, trauma management, the psychological impact of leadership, and society’s mental resilience in the face of war—are not included in the Index.

The Index does not take into account the military medical capacity available on the battlefield, including field hospitals, the number of medical personnel, and evacuation systems, or assess their adequacy.

The absence of information on preparedness for long-term physical and psychological rehabilitation, one of the greatest costs of war, and the failure to take societal morale into consideration do not provide a sufficient basis for assessing the fighting power of armed forces.

As we have sought to demonstrate, the Global Firepower Index is quite inadequate on its own for reflecting a genuine interstate war scenario or the outcome of a conflict.

Global Firepower Index Criteria and the Case of Israel

Israel, with a total population of approximately 9.4 million, ranks 92nd out of 145 countries in terms of population in the Global Firepower (GFP) Index. However, it ranks 15th in military strength, with a PwrIndx score of 0.2707.

With an official land area of 20,770 km², Israel has structured its defense strategy around the aim of capturing the “Promised Land”. Its military is designed to conduct simultaneous operations across the air, naval, land, and cyber domains, enabling it to fight on multiple fronts at the same time and to sustain low-intensity warfare at any given moment.

Since Israel’s defense strategy essentially carries both hybrid and asymmetric characteristics, the Global Firepower Index criteria, which measure conventional warfighting capabilities, are not applicable to this state from the outset.

Israel’s war against organizations such as Hamas and Hezbollah, as well as against Iran, Lebanon, Yemen, and Syria since October 7, 2023, has exposed the capabilities of its military and revealed the gap between the data presented on paper and the realities on the ground.

The Shortage of Military Personnel Cannot Be Overcome

In the Israeli military, whose war strategy is designed to achieve decisive results within a short period of time, the war lasting nearly three years has caused growing fatigue. According to the GFP Index, there should be approximately 669,500 military personnel, yet there is a shortage of thousands. According to official figures, the number of people who have failed to respond to call-up orders or have effectively become draft evaders or absentees has approached 90,000.

On March 26, 2026, Israeli Chief of Staff Eyal Zamir stated that the Israeli military was facing a major personnel crisis, warning, “If we fail to find a solution to the personnel crisis, the army will collapse.”

A Crisis of Confidence Between the Israeli Government and the Military Elite

The distrust that emerged between the Israeli government and the military elite (the General Staff and senior command) after October 7 is deepening day by day. The military command is concerned about soldiers being worn down in the field without a clear political objective. It is argued that the army has reached an unsustainable point due to its manpower, ammunition stocks, and the wear and tear on its armored vehicles.

The view that Netanyahu and his government are unnecessarily prolonging the war in order to extend their political survival and keep the coalition together is widespread among soldiers.

Resistance to Increasing the Defense Budget

The military needs additional funding to continue fighting. While the 2026 General Budget Law envisages a security budget of 112 billion shekels ($37 billion), the Ministry of Defense is seeking to increase the budget to as much as 144 billion shekels ($47.8 billion); however, the Ministry of Finance is resisting an increase in the defense budget. In response, Chief of Staff Eyal Zamir stated, “While the Israel Defense Forces and its personnel are deployed across all fronts, we are forced to fight with ‘empty coffers.’ This situation is negatively affecting the readiness of the Israel Defense Forces.”

The Weapons Inventory Does Not Reflect the Actual Situation

Air superiority occupies a vital place in Israel’s military doctrine. According to the GFP Index, its inventory includes approximately 240 to 300 advanced fighter aircraft (66 F-15s, 174 F-16s, and 45 F-35s). The inventory of the Air Force, which operates from nine air bases, also includes early-warning and support aircraft, attack helicopters, and a large number of UAVs and UCAVs.[ii]

However, these figures in the GFP do not reflect actual warfighting capability. Many of the F-15 and F-16 aircraft and AH-64 Apache attack helicopters in the Air Force inventory have suffered serious metal fatigue and wear due to intensive use. Their electronic warfare and avionics systems are experiencing frequent malfunctions as a result of heavy use. Israeli security reports indicate that many aircraft and helicopters urgently require replacement due to a shortage of parts and the exhaustion of component life cycles.

Because the United States has prioritized meeting the needs of its own military, the supply and replacement of parts have not been carried out on time, leaving a significant portion of the aircraft and helicopters out of service.

The Iron Dome air defense system, regarded as the centerpiece of Israel’s air defense, has turned into a “Leaky Dome” against Iranian missiles; meanwhile, stocks of the costly interceptor missiles used to counter large numbers of low-cost, relatively simple rockets have been significantly depleted.

According to the GFP Index, the Israeli Ground Forces appear to possess 1,300 tanks, along with numerous armored vehicles and personnel carriers. However, it is known that Merkava tanks and armored vehicles suffered serious damage during the Gaza war in Hamas counterattacks, with a significant number being destroyed. Hamas has stated that it has destroyed or rendered more than 1,000 armored vehicles—including Merkava tanks, Namer/Eitan APCs, and bulldozers—out of service.

For this reason, the number of operational tanks and armored vehicles is lower than the figures reported by GFP. A report published by the Israeli newspaper Maariv stated that, in less than three years, the Israeli military had consumed an amount of ammunition equivalent to what it had used over the previous thirty years, and that thousands of engine replacements were required for tanks and armored personnel carriers used in the war.

Israel’s naval forces have been inadequate from the outset: it has seven corvettes, five submarines, and 46 naval patrol vessels. In Israel, where the possibility of a war with Türkiye has been discussed, the inadequacy of its naval forces against the powerful Turkish Navy and the alleged shortcomings in planning have become subjects of criticism.

The Israeli Military Is Dependent on the United States

The Israeli military is not self-sufficient; its defense depends on external assistance and the supply of weapons and ammunition from the United States. Since the United States considers replenishing missile stocks depleted by the crises in Ukraine and the Middle East, as well as acquiring new aircraft, to be a strategic priority, Israel’s requests to purchase F-35 and F-15 fighter aircraft, Apache attack helicopters, and heavy platforms are waiting in extended order queues and have therefore been spread over time.

In addition, due to the crimes against humanity it has committed in Gaza, Israel has increasingly become subject to growing global isolation and arms embargoes. This situation, which negatively affects its weapons inventory, is not reflected in the GFP Index.

The War Has Overwhelmed Israel’s Healthcare System

The deficiencies in healthcare infrastructure, which are not included in the GFP Index, are seriously affecting motivation to enlist and fight in the Israeli military. The Rehabilitation Department of Israel’s Ministry of Defense has stated that the total number of wounded personnel seeking long-term orthopedic treatment, limb transplantation/reconstruction, and intensive physical therapy has exceeded 26,000; the country’s hospital bed capacity is insufficient to meet this need.

Meanwhile, the Ministry of Defense warns that the number of IDF personnel suffering from psychological trauma since October 7, 2023, has reached 50,000 and could exceed 100,000 by 2030. Post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) is also widespread among the children and spouses of reservists.

Conclusion

As the case of Israel demonstrates, the Global Firepower Index (GFP) provides static data that is detached from realities on the ground. Data concerning weapons inventories often do not indicate whether these weapons are actually operational.

The GFP data, which disregard the dynamics of modern warfare, do not take nuclear weapons stockpiles into account, fail to address asymmetric and hybrid warfare that can alter the balance of power, overlook the force-multiplier effect of alliances and geopolitics, exclude human and psychological factors, and do not consider the hidden costs of war. Although such data may provide a rough idea of countries’ armed forces, comparing rival militaries and drawing conclusions based on these figures can be misleading.

SOURCES

[i]2026 Military Strength Ranking

https://www.globalfirepower.com/countries-listing.php

[ii] 2026 Israel Military Strength

https://www.globalfirepower.com/country-military-strength-detail.php?country_id=israel

Sinan Tavukcu, İsrail’in Hamas-İran Savaşı'nda Çöken Karşı Konulamaz(!) “IDF Strategy”si, 29 Haziran 2025.

https://www.sde.org.tr/sinan-tavukcu/genel/israil-in-hamas-iran-savasi-nda-coken-karsi-konulamaz-idf-strategy-si-kose-yazisi-58929