Shafiq Ahmad
Tüm YazılarıPakistan’s temporary closure of trade via two of its major border crossings with Iran has led to speculation as to whether the move was in fact driven by domestic security concerns or by wider pressure from the US on Tehran’s trading partners. The crossings have since been reopened and there is at least some trade going again, but the reasons for the closure, the economic fallout and the degree of US influence on Pakistan’s stance towards Iran remain to be determined.
On October 17, Pakistan suspended trade via the Gabd–Rimdan and Taftan crossings along its 900km (560 mile) border with Iran. This effectively halted all commercial traffic, including Iranian liquefied petroleum gas (LPG), and left hundreds of trucks stranded. Gabd–Rimdan was back in operation after a week and it appears that trade via Taftan has also been temporarily reinstated, though some restrictions remain.
The fundamental question is whether Pakistan was acting essentially out of a desire to deal with security issues and administrative problems or whether it was in fact acting at the behest of the US. Iranian officials and politicians have suggested that US influence was a factor. Of course, the Washington has been very much more aggressive in its economic campaign against Iran than in the past. The question is whether there is any publicly available evidence that the US in fact directed Pakistan to close the crossings.
The argument that US pressure could have an effect on Iran’s neighbors became very pertinent after Washington announced Operation Economic Outcast. On August 24, the US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent announced the operation, describing it as an economic campaign designed to cut off Iran’s financial links around the world. The aim was to cut off the economic lifelines of the Iranian government. Washington also made it clear that any economic engagement with Iran would expose those involved to the reach of US enforcement.
The statement is clear evidence that the Trump administration intends to ramp up the economic pressure on Iran and to target the networks through which it makes its money, gets around sanctions and does its international trading. Such a policy could well create incentives for businesses, financial institutions and governments to reduce their commercial dealings with Iran, especially where such dealings might subject them to US sanctions or restrictions on access to the US financial system.
There is a distinction to be made between Washington’s well-documented policy of applying economic pressure and the specific allegation that it instructed Pakistan to suspend border trade. The former is established by US statements. The latter would require independent evidence of actual pressure, instruction or coordination.
- Pakistan’s stated reasons and economic consequences
Pakistan’s Commerce Ministry suspended trade via Gabd–Rimdan and Taftan, with memorandum rescinding the earlier trade order but did not state the reason for the suspension. Shahid Rind, media and political affairs adviser to the chief minister of Balochistan province, gave security reasons, the prevention of smuggling and better border management as the reasons for the temporary closure.
These comments are especially pertinent given that the crossings are in an area which is itself affected by insurgent violence and other security issues. The government’s stated reason for the suspension is therefore not to be automatically discounted merely on the grounds that it happened at the same time as the US campaign against Iran. At the same time there's no detailed explanation in the original Commerce Ministry memorandum so it's entirely possible that other factors were also at play in the decision.
The economic impact was instant. Traders said the suspension had a direct impact on LPG imports, resulting in shortages and price spikes. Reuters had trade source estimates that Pakistan was importing some 7,000mt of LPG per day from Iran, with over 4,000mt of that coming via Gabd–Rimdan. An interruption of a major source of LPG would put additional pressure on households, transporters, traders and industry in Pakistan. This would be particularly acute as winter approaches and the demand for LPG for heating and cooking will be at its peak.
- Iranian allegations and Pakistan’s response
Iranian political figures have been critical of Islamabad over the suspension and have questioned whether Pakistan had in fact acted at the behest of the US. Fadahossein Maleki, head of the Iran–Pakistan Parliamentary Friendship Group and member of the National Security and Foreign Policy Committee, was also among those reported to have criticized the decision. He was reportedly disappointed at the prospect of Pakistan being under US influence and warned that Iran could consider closing its own land border if the restrictions continued.
Such remarks point to Tehran’s concern that restrictions on cross border trade could damage the overall economic relationship. They also show how a commercial dispute can quickly get caught up in broader regional tensions. Of course, criticism from Iranian politicians in no way by itself proves that Washington was behind Pakistan’s decision.
Iranian Ambassador to Pakistan Reza Amiri Moghadam subsequently gave a different account of the situation. He said at an event in Islamabad that Iran had not in fact put any restrictions on exports to Pakistan, including LPG, and that the problems were due to changes in Pakistan’s E-Form import documentation process. He said talks between the two sides were ongoing. This explanation does of course open up the very real possibility that the disruption was the result of a combination of border control decisions and administrative impediments rather than a formal Iranian export ban.
Pakistan’s Foreign Office spokesperson Sajjad Haider Khan dealt with the matter during his weekly press briefing of October 23, saying Islamabad would abide by the relevant sanctions’ regimes in accordance with both international and domestic law. He did not confirm that Washington had either instructed or pressured Pakistan to close the crossings. His statement is Pakistan’s position on sanctions compliance, it does not in any way confirm that the US pressure was the cause of the suspension of the border. The lack of any direct confirmation does not in any way prove that there were no private discussions.
- Iraq’s border closure and question of coordination
The prospect of a broader US strategy drew even more attention when Iraq closed the al-Sheeb crossing with Iran on October 21. Media reported that the crossing was closed to passengers, vehicles and commercial trucks due to "urgent security concerns" and a review of security arrangements.
Another international media outlet has reported separately, citing political sources who say that Washington was pushing Baghdad to close down further crossings with Iran. One of the sources reportedly said the US Treasury had raised the issue with Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi during his visit to New York in September. These reports do provide a more specific basis on which to assess the possibility of US pressure on Iran’s neighbors than the timing of the closures per se.
The Iraqi case and the Pakistani case must be treated separately. The reports of Washington pressure on Baghdad are no proof of any equivalent pressure on Islamabad. The reporting available does not establish that the two governments acted in concert or that they were operating under a common direction.
- Wider implications for Pakistan–Iran ties
Pakistan is in a position where it has to balance a number of considerations in its dealings with Iran. On the one hand Islamabad has a clear interest in border security, in preventing smuggling, in fulfilling its legal obligations and in protecting its financial and commercial links with the wider world. On the other, cross border trade is a lifeline for people, provides access to essential goods and is a key contributor to the economy of Balochistan province.
Pakistan also has its own reasons to avoid an escalation with Iran. Disruption to trade would be a source of friction between the two neighbors, would impact the border areas and would in all likelihood undermine the broader diplomatic efforts.
The fact that commercial activity has resumed following the suspension would seem to indicate that the disruption was not necessarily intended to be a permanent closure. That said, simply reopening does not in any way explain why the suspension was originally implemented.
The longer-term issue is whether Pakistan and Iran can work out some clearer procedures on trade, customs documentation, security and the movement of LPG tankers. If they can do that then it would be possible to avoid future disputes becoming mired in the wider strategic rivalry.
- Claims of US naval activity near Pakistan
Separately an Iranian media outlet has been running claims of a possible US naval deployment in the waters off Pakistan as part of preparations for possible action against Iran. Pakistan’s Ministry of Information and Broadcasting has shot down the claim that the US Navy was operating against Iran from Pakistani territory with Islamabad’s approval. In a statement of October 18, Pakistan’s Information and Broadcasting Ministry described the allegation as " purely fabricated propaganda ".
The mere presence of US vessels in the wider Arabian Sea or Gulf of Oman would not in itself indicate that Pakistan had authorized an attack on Iran or that an attack was going to happen.
- Conclusion: Pressure, security or a combination of the two?
Pakistan’s suspension of trade with Iran took place at a time when Washington was ramping up its economic campaign against Tehran. The US Treasury’s announcement of Operation Economic Outcast is a clear indication of the Trump administration's intent to cut off Iran’s financial and commercial arteries. The reports of US pressure on Iraq provide further grounds for considering whether similar pressure may have been brought to bear elsewhere.
However, the evidence to date does not establish that the US instructed Pakistan to close the Gabd–Rimdan and Taftan crossings. Pakistan gave security, anti-smuggling and border management as reasons for the closure and Iran’s ambassador attributed the disruption to changes in the import documentation.
The most defensible view is that the border suspension took place in the context of broader US economic pressure on Iran. The degree to which that pressure may have influenced Pakistan’s decision is not established.
By Shafiq Ahmad
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