The motivation is clear and the principles behind Chinese foreign policy in the Middle East is not revolutionary. The goal is to bolster trade, but most importantly, to develop a trade network that will support China’s future petroleum demand. The principle, as it has been for over two decades, is business over politics.[2] [3] The business that has been taking place between China and the Middle East breaks into four well-worn categories: petroleum, military, cheap Chinese consumer goods, and service goods, usually Chinese engineering and workers commissioned to do projects in the Middle East. In parallel with these economic exchanges there is an ongoing cultural exchange which China is enthusiastically pursuing in countries like Egypt, Algeria, and Saudi Arabia, as well as with institutions like the China-African Forum and the China-Arab States Cooperation Forum. In June 2010 the Research Center for China-Arab States Cooperation Forum was launched at the Middle Eastern Studies Institute of Shanghai International Studies University.[4]

 

In 1993, China became a net importer of petroleum (though this is contested,[5] the point is that China has huge and increasing petroleum imports) and we can only assume that these numbers are going to vastly increase. Sixteen years later, in the wake of the ongoing economic crisis in the West, China made two important milestones, one in import and one in export. This was undoubtedly due to the asymmetry between China’s deft handling of the economic crisis and the United States’ severe lack there of, but it is widely believed that these milestones are just the beginning of future trends. First, China imported more Saudi petroleum than the United States.[6] Keeping in mind that today over half of China’s petroleum comes comes from abroad, 47 percent of Chinese petroleum imports come from the Middle East, and 30 percent from Africa.[7] Second, China overtook the US as the largest exporter to the Middle East, it’s exports to the region having grown from $4bn in 1999 to $60bn a decade later.[8] Egypt predicts that China will replace the US as the largest exporter to Egypt by 2012.[9] As a cultural aside, it is interesting to note the appearance of places like Yiwu, a small town outside of Shanghai that has become a Mecca for Arab traders.[10] 

 

These developments in the business sector are most likely to be overarching trends. Revolutions, the popularity of democratic ideology, and other changes in the Middle East are not going to chance the material facts of increasing economic interdependence and need for cooperation, especially when it comes to petroleum. Though China certainly has long term goals to become as petroleum-independent as possible (and this is manifested in its international relations in Central Asia, with Russia, the oil pipelines,etc), this is not going to happen within the next few decades,[11] certainly not by 2030 when it is expected that China will be importing 10.5 million barrels of petroleum per day from the Middle East alone. That is over five times the 2030 projected petroleum import of Japan. The current US import is approximately 7.53 million barrels per day.[12] 

 

It is inevitable that the trade will continue under most political situations, however it is also inevitable that the Chinese foreign policy of business over politics and soft power through economic relationships will be increasingly challenged globally, especially in the Middle East. American strategists claim that this is because of the need of a military presence to preserve “stability,” that is, the stability of petroleum and cash flows.[13] If this is the case, and the increased Chinese military presence as well as recent events certainly give evidence for the Chinese government’s belief in this claim, then the Chinese arms trade in the Middle East is already strategic, not just economic. We can be sure that such a flow exists to Iran because of incidents like the critical hit of a Israeli warship by an Iranian made Chinese anti-ship missile in 2006.[14] The CIA indicates that there is an exchange of more advanced weaponry including nuclear and chemical weapons technology that China may be selling to countries like Iran and Saudi Arabia.[15] 

There is also significant arms trade between Israel and China. In 2002, Israel was second only to Russia in selling military goods to China.[16] However, such trade has been presumably curtailed due to United States pressure on Israel.[17] [18]

 

In addition to arms partnerships with countries like Iran, there are rumors that China is starting to consider building permanent military bases around the world like the United States. In July 2010 a controversial article was published in English by Shen Dingli, an international relations professor at Fudan University, which called for China to start building military bases around the world.[19] Since then controversy regarding a possible Chinese base in the Pakistani port city of Gwadar has been met with a clear denial from Beijing, but along with an affirmation of China’s need to build military bases abroad in the interests of international peace.[20] [21] These are strong indicators of China’s shift to hard power to secure its petroleum interests. As this shift takes place China will have to negotiate its military relationship with the United States in the region. The asymmetry between American military might in the Middle East, and Chinese consumption of Middle Eastern petroleum, is believed by American analysts to be a critical point of the future international relations in the region.[22] Furthermore, it is thought that the Chinese will not be able to sustain its export of military arms and technology to countries like Iran for fear of potential destabilizing effects. In other words, in addition to being fiscally responsible, China will have to start being politically responsible when it comes to its international trade agreements.

 

China has awaken from its slumber, some say that the civil war in Libya may be remembered as the event that forced China out from under the covers.[23] This is due to the increasingly large investment of the Chinese service industry in the Middle East, especially in large scale engineering projects. The evacuation of 32,000 Chinese workers from Libya by plane and frigate is a turning point. It is symbolic of the inevitability of China’s direct involvement in the region in the upcoming future.[24] [25] It is also worth noting that Libya is just one of the countries that has huge service trade relations with China and thus large numbers of Chinese workers. Chinese workers are the second largest foreign community in Algeria, most of whom are involved in Algeria’s development efforts. Ten percent of the funding of for Algeria’s development efforts have gone exclusively to over fifty Chinese firms.[26] [27] China cannot and will not be able to continue its petroleum, consumer goods, and service trade activities in the Middle East without bringing onto itself responsibilities that have to be backed up with action. At the very least, China will finally have to interpret for itself the ancient phrase “Civis Romanus sum.”[28]

 

But these events are only the result of instability and say nothing about the potential effects of a Middle East pointed towards democracy. It is hard to say exactly how such a Middle East, with a deep and hard-won democratic core, will put a twist the current diplomatic situation. What we can be sure of is that if democracy becomes the new paradigm in the Middle East, China will have to completely rethink how it deals with oppressive and democratic regimes alike, especially the ones that are imperative for its continuing economic ascension. The newly democratic countries in the Middle East will also need to figure out how to maintain increasingly vital economic relations with a government equally oppressive to the ones that they have fought hard to vanquish. Undoubtedly, it will be figured out, because all of the parties invovled need the trade relations. The question is “how?” Perhaps democratization will mean becoming closer to the West, and a participation in the heavy-handed fight against oppressive non-democratic governments world-wide. Of course, it is also feasible that the new Middle East will want to use China’s power as leverage against the West and as a way of establishing independence once and for all. 

 

Perhaps it will mean real support for the Uighur Muslims and thus outright opposition to the Chinese government. Uighur resistance continues to be active, as does strong Chinese response to such activities, as recent events in Khotan show.[29] Political and possible material support from the Middle East may balance the scales in what has so far been a fairly one sided dominance of China over the Uighers. This is especially true in light of what has so far been a failure of Chinese policies like “In the east there was Shen Zhen, in the west there is Kashgar.” [30] [31] China employs essentially the same ideas in its international relations: economic prosperity cools political friction. The fact that this has not been in the case in Xinjiang is yet another sign that China must begin pioneering other approaches if it wants a non-violent solution. Furthermore, the failure in Xinjiang of economics over politics may be an indicator of the future of such approaches in the Middle East.

 

There are also rumors of a “Jasmine Revolution” inspired in part by the Arab Spring. Such rumors seem to have put the government particularly on edge and have prompted violent action as shown by Ai Wei Wei’s recent testimony about his three-month detention as well as detention of other Chinese resistors of the authoritarian regime such as Ran Yun Fei and Wang Li Hong.[32] 

 

A largely democratic Middle East has the potential to isolate China and pressure it politically, and maybe even economically. Whereas until now China has enjoyed the benefits of neutral rising power, engaging in supposedly neutral business deal after business deal, the Arab Spring is putting China’s new international status to the test and may continue to do so.

 

Turkey has much to gain by cooperation with China, as does almost every other nation in the world. We can only assume that China is the key to the future global economy, as well as a military superpower. All nations are trying to have a piece of that cake and Turkey is no different.  Similar to other countries in the Middle East, Turkey too can view China as an opportunity to “look East” and gain a new type of autonomy from the West. Chinese press claims to be opening its doors both economically, politically, and culturally, to its comrades in arms against Western Orientalism.[33]

 

From the Chinese perspective, Turkey may be a key strategic country both at home and abroad. The Uighurs are after all, a Turkic people, with unending cultural, linguistic, historical, and religious connections with Turkey. This deep connection had a political expression in 2010 when Erdogan described the plight of the Uighurs as a genocide.[34] While this statement led to nothing but controversy, Turkey has the increasing power to be a deadly thorn in China’s back. This is only compounded by the similar cultural ties that Turkey has to much of Central Asia (depending on how broadly you define the region), and the region’s importance for Chinese long-term petroleum plans. Furthermore, if indeed Turkey becomes the regional leader of the Middle East, then China’s petroleum and trade interests will inevitably involve Turkey as well. In other words, Turkey stands at the crossroads both geographically and culturally to both of China’s main petroleum supplies.

 

Still, there seem to be relatively little cultural exchange between the two countries, unlike the developments in Egypt for example.[35]  This may indicate that the relationship is in its adolescence and is only a portion of what is possible in the near future.

 

*SDE Intern 

NOTES

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