Turkish-Chinese relations, which almost came to the breaking point a year ago, are quickly developing these days with a series of reciprocal high-level visits in recent months.

 

In the wake of the Chinese premier’s Ankara visit at the start of October, Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu has just wrapped up a one-week visit to China with a delegation of businessmen. What’s more, in addition to eight wide-ranging pacts signed in Ankara covering topics ranging from transportation to energy, it is also now anticipated that Turkey and China will be signing a new pact aimed at forming a strategic cooperation council. Just as shown by the air force exercises last month in Konya that included the Chinese air force, relations between Turkey and China are increasingly becoming deeper and more varied. Most important of all, however, is the creation of an atmosphere of political trust between the political elite in the capitals of these two nations. And the most significant sign of these are the reciprocal agreements that have been reached in connection to the critical topic of the Uyghur Turks.

 

 

Rather than continuing mutual tensions, it appears that Beijing and Ankara have now understood that it is much more important to focus on opportunities to cooperate within the framework of a fast changing global order. One of the most important concrete advantages to be gained by Beijing from new political and strategic relations with Ankara is obtaining support from Ankara on the subject of stability in East Turkistan. To wit, Turkey feels a sense of responsibility in the face of both history and humanity when it comes to the Uyghur people, and it does not shy away from bringing up the topic at international platforms, even at the risk of causing tensions with China. The fact though that Beijing gave its approval for Davutoğlu to start off his China visit in Kashgar shows that China understands Turkish sensitivities on the topic of the Uyghurs, and that it trusts Ankara on this front. And in fact, this is the sort of sign required by the new modus vivendi in political relations between the two countries; it is, as Davutoğlu called it, “the normalization of history.”

 

There are a few basic motifs at this point that can be pointed to as pulling China closer to Turkey. The first is that it is no longer a nation whose passive foreign policy is guided by NATO, as it was during the Cold War. To the contrary, it is a rising power which has the potential to create a variety of different links with other countries in a range of international platforms, from the United Nations Security Council to the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) to the G-20. Thus Beijing perceives it as strategically smart to move in coordination with such a nation, rather than against it. It also appears that Ankara’s state responses to the Mavi Marmara event, as well as the agreement between Turkey and Brazil in light of the Iranian nuclear crisis have made important impressions on Beijing. In addition, China is currently very uncomfortable with the regional instability that has been derived from ongoing US and NATO military operations in nearby neighboring regions of Afghanistan and Pakistan. The future of Pakistan, a close friend and ally of both China and Turkey, is also compelling closer cooperation between China and Turkey. After all, an unstable Pakistan functions as a factor which legitimizes a deep-rooted Western presence in the region. At the same time, there is Iran, which plays a significant role in meeting China’s petrol needs. Both Ankara and Beijing perceive any possible US-Israel attacks on Iran as a serious potential threat to regional peace and their respective national energy needs. Both countries have some of the world’s fastest growing economies and thus both have needs for peace as well as for dependable energy sources. Thus, there are a range of very realistic and strong economic and security bases for the building cooperation between China and Turkey.

 

 

Another basic factor pulling China towards Turkey is the range of geopolitical and strategic characteristics possessed by the Uyghur Autonomous Region. Geographically speaking, East Turkistan is China’s doorway to Central Asia, and even the West. The region neighbors Mongolia, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan and India. What’s more, it also possesses what is perhaps China’s most significant reserves of underground and above ground resources. According to official reports, 138 of the total 168 mines in China are located in this region. Not only that, but one-third of the total petrol reserves in China are also located in East Turkistan, as are 40 percent of the nation’s natural gas and coal reserves. The region is also very rich in minerals, with gold in the Altay Mountains and uranium and other strategic natural materials present, too. In addition to all of the above, East Turkistan also has rich agricultural potential, and is an important food production region for the highly populated Chinese nation.

 

Energy lines that enter China from Russia and Central Asian countries also pass through the East Turkistan region. It is for this reason in particular that China responds so strongly to even the smallest protests by the local Muslim population. The Chinese administration, which always viewed any sort of pan-Turkism as a very serious threat, has in the post-Sept. 11 world, tried to equate the local population’s cultural demands with terrorism, thus attempting to gain the support of the Western world. China is, in fact, tied strongly to East Turkistan on the front of its own economic development, due precisely to the natural resources in the region. But at the same time, the region is an open contradiction to Beijing’s proclaimed aims for a “harmonious society,” and since it has also become a hotspot of critical uprisings, it is also China’s weak spot in many ways. With Turkey’s improving image amongst the Uyghur population of China, and in light of Ankara’s consistent approach saying that the Uyghur problems need to be solved within the framework of China’s land unity, Beijing wants to take advantage of Turkey’s soft power in this arena.

 

 

The Chinese administration understands Turkey’s historical, religious and cultural ties to the region. Beijing these days looks warmly upon the entrance by Turkey’s state and private sector to the East Turkistan region; it wants to take advantage of the opportunities presented by this situation. Within this framework, it would be highly appropriate for Turkish business figures to set up visits to the Urumqi, Kashgar and Turfan regions as soon as possible. The region is as yet relatively undiscovered when it comes to international investment. Also, the potential for investment in sectors such as food, textiles and construction is quite high. The possibilities for construction activity in Urumqi alone are of the dimension that could bring about entirely new moves across the Turkish construction sector. There are many important opportunities for companies that work in road construction, the building of airports and the petrol-chemical area. Groups and organizations such as the Turkish Exporters Assembly (TİM), Foreign Economic Relations Board (DEİK), Turkish Industrialists and Businessmen’s Association (TÜSİAD) and the Turkish Confederation of Businessmen and Industrialists (TUSKON) need to develop projects that will encourage further investment and exploration in these areas.

 

At the same time, ease of transportation is extremely important when it comes to sustaining regional cooperation in East Turkistan. Davutoğlu’s visit to China is hoped to initiate a mutual agreement that would see the start-up of regular flights between İstanbul and Urumqi. The total direct flight time between these two cities is only five hours. What’s more, a regular flight schedule would increase reciprocal trade and tourist opportunities. As relations increase and develop, and there are more investments, the economic situation of the Uyghur population will also improve. The regional population, depressed as a result of economic poverty and political pressure, would be given a boost in morale by the presence of Turkish companies in the region. Opportunities for cooperation should also be developed in the arenas of education and culture. For example, there could be agreements signed between Turkish and Chinese universities that would foster special education funds for student exchange programs. There could also be sister-city agreements that would invigorate historical relations between perhaps Kashgar and Konya, Urumqi and Bursa, or İstanbul and Shanghai