Modern Turkish Republic was founded by Mustafa Kemal Ataturk and his friends after the First World War. All were military leaders committed to a secular western world-view. Inspired by the French Enlightenment ideology, their single-party rule adopted a top-down approach to modernize Turkish society by identifying modernity with democracy. The founders viewed tradition and Islam as a barrier before modernization and, therefore, implemented heavy-handed policies to limit the public role of religion in society. In this period the Republican People's Party (CHP) controlled the military and the state.

 

The transition to democracy after the World War II created a major rift between democracy and modernization because traditional sectors of Turkish society mostly resisted the state-led-modernization project. During the 1950 elections the CHP lost his government to the Democratic Party (DP) that tolerated religious activities and won popular votes for a decade. Losing hope with democracy, in 1960 the military expelled the DP government from power by accusing it for compromising secularism and later left power to the CHP in the mid-1960s.

 

Despite its general libertarian outlook, the military-designed Constitution of 1960 put limitations on civilian power by establishing constitutional bodies independent of civilian supervision. Among them were the National Security Council, the Constitutional Court, the Turkish Radio and Television, the High Council of Judges and other institutions of science, statistics, export and strategies. These instiutions mostly aimed to supervise civilian activities in their respective areas of operation. For example, the National Security Council monopolized security policies in the country. The 1982 Constitution penned after a military coup maintained the same militarist spirit by also removing some of its libertarian features and allowed the control and/or suppression of civil society.

 

In addition to frequent military interventions in Turkish politics since 1960, the constitutional arrangments granted a strong leverage to the generals. This was most visible in the actions of the National Security Council acting outside and above the Parliament and civilian supervision. Consititutionally military members constituting a majority in the Council were able to dictate priorities in security issues, foreign policies and even some domestic policies.

 

The military's orientation affected Turkish foreign relations with Greece, Armenia and Israel for a long time. For example, the military leaders maintained a hawkish attitude in Turkey's relations with Greece and Armenia. They even signed military cooperation agreements with Israel in 1997 despite the dislike of the Islamic Welfare Party government. Similarly, the National Security Council decided that the Islamic high schools and headscarf (hijab) posed a threat to security and forced the Civilian government to implement policies curbing such practices.

 

When the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) come to power in 2002, the military did not prevent it from taking office due to a severe economic crisis in the country and to a exceptionally democratic orientation of the chief of staff, Hilmi Özkök. However, a big divide between the democractic and authoritarian camps in military leadership became apparent in the subsequent years. It was later known that some generals were secretly preparing to topple the government from power as others were opposing such actions. In these years the AK Party tried not to challenge the military's power. It tried to limit its constitutional role by ammending constitutional articles as part of democratization and the membership reforms required by the European Union.

 

In the early years the AK Party government chose to focus on economy and social services rather than confronting military and the secular establishment. The civilian authorty did not also intervene in the promotion process within military ranks as well as in security policies. A major confrontation happened between the government and the military during the Presidential Elections of 2007 where the military publicly rejected a president, Abdullah Gül as his wife wearing headscarf was viewed as a sign of reactionary Islam. In the face of the military's ultimatum, the AK Party government rejected the intervention and refered to an early parliamentary elections. It won the 47 percent of the votes and Abdullah Gül was elected as president in the Parliament. This was both symbolic and instrumental in assuring the superiority of civilian authority over the military and in normalizing religious practices in the country. Military leaders gradually began to admit the civilian authority in foreign policy and security issues. 

 

The year 2010 was a period where the civil-military relations were mostly changed in favor of the civilians in Turkey. For example, the government tried to solve the long-hauled Kurdish problem outside a security perspective and the military did not oppose it publicly. Similarly, the military leadership seemed to go along with the AK Party government's support for the Freedom Flotilla known as Mavi Marmara in order to break Israel's embargo in Gazza. Moreover, the constitutional amendment that made the military accountable to the civilian authority and civilian courts was approved with a clear majority in the same year.

 

For a long time the High Military Council kept firing military personnelle suspected of religious fanatism from their posts without a right to appeal and also insulated the promotions of their personnelle from civilian intervention. However, in 2010 the AK Party government insisted on using its constitutional authority to appoint the military leadership with regard to some high ranking soldiers allegedly involved in a coup plot against the government. The incumbent generals insisted that the generales under trial were to be promoted. However, the government refused these demands and appointed supposedly more democratic generals, instead.

 

Some claim that the suspects of the coup trial are framed on fabricated evidence. Considering a long tradition of military coups in Turkey since the 1960s and the military's obvious dislike against the pro-Islamic government in addition to unresolved high profile political assasinations to stir chaos in the county during the last decade, we need to wait till the end of the suit before ruling out the possibility.

 

This year's struggle between the AK Party government and the military was critical as more generals become imprisoned on charges of coup attempts. Becasuse of the institutional solitarity within the military and the government's insistence not to use its constitutional authority in promoting and appointing generals, the leaders of armed forces, including the chief of staff Işık Koşaner, resigned to protest the situation. However, the Prime Minister Erdogan and the President Gül insisted on their plans and appointed other generals in their places.

 

There were also a symbolic dimension of the late struggle implying the future of civil-military relations in Turkey. The chief of staff used to co-head the meetings of the High Military Council along with the Prime Minister, implying equavalence of their status (left). This has also changed as as Erdogan headed the last meeting alone and the chief of staff, Necdet Ozel, sat next to other generals (buttom).

 

To sum up, the military's traditional popularity in Turkish society along with other constitutional previleges make it less accountible to civilian authority. Previously they managed to insulate the promotion of its personnel from the latter. The generals also used to monoplize security policies and had a major voice in the country's foreign policy priorities. During the last two years the AK Party government took away these privileges from them and began applied its own agenda more assertively. The new situation means the victory of the civilian authority over the military, marking a further consolidation of democracy in Turkey.