Perhaps it is not possible to say that AK Party has resolved the Kurdish issue in the 9 years period of rule, but it is an obvious reality that it has set the most radical steps concerning the recognition of Kurdish identity and the rights of Kurds since the proclamation of the republic. In this period for the first time the Kurdish identity has been recognized officially and the problems that Kurds experienced due to Kurdish identity has been handled. Doing politics on Kurdish identity has been more legitimate when compared to 90s. In 1993 the presence of the deputies of the Democracy Party (DEP), the predecessor of today’s Peace and Democracy Party (BDP), in the National Assembly was only tolerated for a few months and one day they were sent to prison after taken from the Assembly at a moment’s notice of the court. Today, in spite of following ethnic policies without any feeling of concealing their relations with the Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK) defined as a terrorist organization and even representing this illegal organization, their presence in the Assembly is not objected; moreover, they even are expected to be in the Assembly and contribute to the solution. When the Supreme Committee of Elections (YSK) vetoed the BDP candidates to enter election all political and civil society actors in Turkey compromising over a response in favor of the BDP, demanded that the BDP candidates should not be prevented from entering general elections.
However, it is difficult to say that the BDP tries to contribute to the development of democracy in the country in return of this affirmative attitude of Turkish public opinion towards the BDP. As the democratic solution process progresses and the political ground is enriched with choices which enables handling and resolving all problems, the endeavors of the PKK and the BDP to impoverish this ground has already been accustomed to. There is a visible parallelism between the advancement in democratization process beginning in 2004 in Turkey and the increase in violence or terrorist actions of the PKK which attempted to halt the democratizing paces. This shows the support that both the PKK and its political extensions give to the endeavors of utilizing the Kurdish issue as a sabotaging factor rather than a propellant power for democratization of Turkish politics.
If the Premier’s thesis “the Kurdish issue has been resolved” carries a meaning that there remains nothing to be done concerning the issue, undoubtedly it is not acceptable. There is much to be done. But if it carries a claim that the legal, political, sociological and psychological grounds have been prepared to handle the issue, then it is quite right. What is more, such a phrase shows an approach inviting to good will and constructive approaches concerning the issue. There is no other way but for this if the solution of the issue with all dimensions is expected. We all saw and perhaps we will see what the attempts to exaggerate the issue by filling all relevant or irrelevant stuff into the box of Kurdish issue claiming that it has not been resolved do serve.
The instances presented to show that the Kurdish issue has not been resolved are the 10 percent election threshold, the enforcements in the Union of Kurdistan Communities (KCK) lawsuits, military operations and education in mother tongue. However, interestingly neither of the aforementioned issues is directly related to the Kurdish Issue.
To begin with the demand of education in mother tongue, it is a significant unresolved part Kurdish issue. A solution frame that doesn’t grant the right of education in mother tongue will never be able to resolve the problem. However, the attitude that the Premier Erdoğan exhibited lagged behind the minimum bar. But this issue is not inarguable. The political ground is now convenient for the persuasion of the parties. The Premier also has expressed his view and in democracies no one’s statement is unconditional even if he is a Premier.
The election threshold issue is a general problem of Turkish democracy and its target is not only the Kurds but it also targets all opposition parties. As a matter of fact, the BDP has already made it nonfunctional in a certain way peculiar to itsef. Therefore, the aforementioned threshold does not influence Kurdish politics primarily; it works against all other small parties particularly the National Progress Party (MHP). The assertion by the BDP concerning this issue, as if it has been set as a means of preventing them, doesn’t carry any other meaning other than on one hand an exaggeration and on the other a damnification discourse converted into political gains. What is more, the agenda concerning the reduction of the threshold is not something impossible to be carried on a democratic deliberation stage.
At the mean time, the KCK lawsuits as well as military operations are not directly related to the Kurdish issue. It is a typical reflex that a typical state served against the armed threat, terror, blackmail and oppression of state-like formations on civilian people. There may be unfair treatments or mistakes, but the essence of the issue is not related to Kurdish issue; instead, it is related to law and security of the citizens. Disarmament of the PKK and maintaining it to participate politics is also a problem to be resolved. The solution of this problem should be separately focused on. However, it is clear that the solution doesn’t pass through leaving the region to the organized and armed tutelage of the PKK.
There is an unacceptable threat and oppression that the KCK practices create on the people living in the region. There is a privilege demanded in this respect but this is not acceptable not only in terms of the security of the state but also in terms of the security and welfare of the citizens living in the region.
The PKK utilizes the military operations as a justification for its actions but it is not concealed any more that all of the military and civil operations are converted into co-operations against democracy through a timely synchronization with the actions of the PKK. Daglıca, Aktütün, Anafartalar, Gedikli, Reşadiye, Kastamonu and so on the list can be extended. What is the position of the PKK and the deep state power focuses in all these operations? And where does the BDP situate here? On the other hand, what is the position of the powers trying to improve democracy and peace in this context and what are they doing?
We put the PKK aside. When it comes to the BDP, unfortunately, it works at a position that anti-democratic power focuses benefit, instead of contributing to the democratization of Turkey as a whole. It serves an invaluable opportunity area for the power focuses trying to halt democracy on a silver platter. Every conscientious Kurd can clearly see that there is no gain for Kurdish people at such a position; contrarily it inflicts a different tyranny upon them.
Although the statements of co-chair of Congress of Democratic Community (DTK) Aysel Tuğluk at the end of the DTK meeting saying “I feel that dangerous things will come about” are claimed to be a designation concerning certain retrograding issues regarding the Kurdish issue, they were more prone to be considered as a threat in terms of their timing open to question in all respects. Even if something goes bad concerning the Kurdish issue, as a member of a political party, she was expected to utter more conciliatory words to the grassroots. However, instead of conciliating she preferred a way that will aggrandize the tension as her friends in the party always do. The words used in the rest of the statement were of a kind “where to mend.”
“Kurds have issued their verdict, if things do not work with the state our public is sufficiently organized to establish their democracy and to live in that system.”
These words, besides showing the threat that the mentality and political method of the BDP carries for democracy, reveal how the aforementioned mentality imagines Kurdish people. Tugluk has already gone beyond speaking on behalf of the BDP and the PKK she speaks on behalf of all Kurds and behaves as if she is sure that their decision is the decision of all Kurds. While saying “Kurdish people have issued their verdict” she speaks on behalf of all Kurds. If so, then if she is able to speak on behalf of 17-20 million Kurdish people, then we can ask why she applied to election as independent candidate instead of attending under the BDP as a party, because there should not be any obstacles such as 10 percent threshold for a party speaking on behalf of all Kurds. However, both the form of candidacy and the roles they play during the election period clearly show the extent of organic relation between them and Kurdish people.
Furthermore, primarily Kurdish people know that “the organized community” that Tugluk referred to is organization of PKK and this organized group is far apart from both values and problems of Kurdish people and it is ready to ravage not only Kurdish people but also Turkey for its survival. Only fascism, massacre and racism come out of this organized body for Kurdish people. There is no other good out of that for Kurds.
The PKK insist on identification of its own survival problem with the Kurdish issue and wants everybody to consent this. However, it knows very well that it doesn’t believe in such an identification itself and even half of the Kurdish population which reaches 20% in Turkey will not vote for it and thus, calculates in accordance with this fact.
Therefore, the argument that the Kurdish issue has been resolved is not even discussed. It annoys, irritates and even is sentenced as a part of the discourse of denial of the issue. Because, there is already nothing remained but for the attitudes of those who benefit from the issue by showing it greater or more different than it is. They have commoditized the Kurdish issue and sell it cheaply.
Translation: ELVANİ