The demonstrations in Iran are held with the inspiration and under the influence of the movements which succeeded in Tunisia and Egypt. In a sense, this is the share of Iran from domino impact. However, it is difficult to say that the events in Iran are similar to those in Tunisia, Egypt and even Yemen, Libya or Bahrain, because in Iran the ruling power has a grassroots as strong as that of the opposition. It is known that 4 million people effusively participated to the celebration of Revolution just 2 days before the demonstrations on 14^th February. The support for the ruling power in Iran has not dissolved yet, while in Egypt and Tunisia there was an opposition at the level of consensus against Mubarek and Bin Ali.

 

Spokesman of Iranian Assembly Ali Laricani, in his speech at the assembly, while accusing the US and the West claiming that the demonstrators had “external connections;” deputies made an appearance with the slogans such as “Death to the US!”, “Death to Israel!”, “Death to Kerrubi!”, “Death to Moussavi!” and “Death to Khatemi!” during his speech in which he criticized the opposition leaders for publishing declarations. Both Kerrubi and Moussavi whose death they shouted for were two prominent politicians of Khomeini and played important roles in the Revolution. Hereby, the Revolution created its own opposition and this shaped a luridly irritable status quo against it. The state doesn’t need to resist the opposition; the potency of Revolution organized at all levels of society works with its imperious tone and sentences any criticism or opposition as “treachery.”

 

The criticism of Ayatollah Montazeri years ago, who was declared as his successor by Khomeini in his lifetime, saying “what did we produce after the Revolution except for slogans; we should handle our responsibility and our share first instead of accusing the US or anyone else” is quite meaningful today. Montazeri, actually for these criticisms was discredited in a short time and came to a point of being deposed from his position as Caliphate. Furthermore, even in this deposition an accusation that he was “under the influence of external powers” was assumed persuasive enough.

 

This situation that Iran stuck in after the Revolution requires us to rethink the concept of Revolution. Conversion of a movement or revolt or a social events into a Revolution doesn’t mean that there will be a heavenly and roseate milieu in the end of it. The direction that a revolution takes or what it converts into is not independent of the expectation, imagination, ethical and humane qualities of its actor. No revolution has ever changed the human nature substantially. The ambitions, mordant and poignant power of potency, the feeling of greed and rivalry in human nature come onto the stage in a short time after the revolution.       

 

On one hand, while the demonstrations against the revolution or the government continue in Iran, on the other hand, Iranians try to understand the events in the Middle East, Egypt, Tunisia, Yemen and Bahrain. They try to calculate the possible risks that these events may bring and to take precautions in accordance.

 

The political analysts whom we talked to at a roundtable meeting titled “Recent Developments in The Middle East and Turkish-Iranian Relations” held at the Institute of Political and International Relations Studies (IPIS), though cautiously, try to question the trace or influence of the US and Israel on the developments in the Middle East. Therefore, they stated that the US would not dispense from Egypt so easily and since she has been powerful in this region for a long time, it is difficult to be convinced that she doesn’t have any influence on these events.

 

We, on the other hand, focus on the possibility that these events are “social earthquakes.” The US may have “the earliest intervention” advantage in these earthquakes. However, regardless of the extent of her intervention the respective social earthquakes have changed all balances in the Middle East and Egypt. From now on, nothing will be the same and everyone should read this new juncture well. It is likely that those who read the juncture well will come out better off. The way that the US can get the best of this process is to come out “with a minimum loss” because when compared with the previous conditions, no order in the future will be better than the past.

 

A note from the meeting in which we talked many things for three hours:

 

One of the Iranian participants touched upon the concerns related to the tensions in Shiite-Sunni axis stating that Premier Erdoğan’s speech at Kerbela meetings in Halkalı (Istanbul) was greeted with astonishment and a powerful honour. I reminded him that in one of his speech to Iraqis, the Premier stated that he defined himself “not as a Sunni but as a Muslim.” In fact Sunni is not even an identity in Turkey. The Muslims in Turkey, despite of being Sunnis, take the part of Imam Ali and Imam Hussein in the arguments which they took part and this is a prominent advantage against the Shiite-Sunni centered separations. Therefore, it can be said that it is possible to handle the issue with an alternative philosophy of history in that way. We don’t have the chance to serve a delicate arbitrage to the events in post-Prophet history.