In May, the ruling AK Party managed to wage a major campaign for a constitutional amendment with its narrow legislative margin necessary for referendum. As the opposition parties (namely, the Republican People’s Party or CHP and the nationalist MHP) opposed and boycotted the voting due to the critical nature of the change in the regime. The change involved a stronger parliamentary role in the formation of top judicial bodies such as the Constitutional Court and the High Council of Judges and Prosecutors. Both pro-establishment parties opposed the changes, fearing the loss of their privileged status in the political system. The CHP leaders even took the issue to the Supreme Court, claiming the unconstitutionality of the venture.

 

As the guardians of the secular establishment, the Constitutional Court approved the constitutionality of the amendment due to be put to referendum on September 12 this fall. The amendment enhances the accountability of the military by introducing further judicial supervision on their practices, by allowing the trial of the generals in civilian courts and especially the trial of the generals of the 1980 coup. It also makes it hard to ban political parties by strengthening their constitutional status through free speech and guaranteed service.

 

The amendment also sanctions affirmative action to assure the social inclusion of disadvantaged social categories such as women, children and the handicapped and furthers the organizational and political rights of the civil servants. Moreover, it increases labor rights by increasing the scope of labor activities and strikes. It also guarantees the protection of privacy, the freedom of movement and introduces the institution of ombudsman for public inspection.

 

The outcome of the referendum is likely to be a major political victory for the AK Party as the polls shows a major public support for the plan. The interesting result of this process was the situation of the ethnic Turkish party (BDP). The BDP unexpectedly rejected the amendment by arguing that that it did not meet their demands for ethnic rights. For the first time, the BDP looked in alignment with the two statist parties CHP and MHP, both of which vehemently opposed the AK Party attempt to extend ethnic and cultural rights last year. The amendment did not directly address the ethnic questions but improving democratization in Turkey would definitely benefit ethnic parties such as the BDP.

 

After the Supreme Court opened the way to referendum, both the CHP and the MHP said they would campaign against the amendment while the BDP would reportedly boycott it. Along with its legal and democratic provisions, this process is likely to deeply affect the Turkish political map in favor of the AK Party. The process may marginalize political parties opposing the change for an advanced democracy. As a result, the AK Party can maintain its strong presence in the southern eastern region mostly populated with the Kurds at the expense of the BDP in the next year’s election.

 

This amendment clearly puts the challenger BDP on a wrong footing with its constituency that wants a further democracy and the rule of law. Under the shadow of the armed PKK, the BDP previously tried to dominate the Kurdish provinces but fell short against the AK Party’s inclusionary discourse in the region. This process might weaken the former’s popularity in the region as other minor Kurdish parties (e.g. Şerafettin Elçi’s KADEK and Bayram Bozyel’s HAK-PAR) began to challenge a BDP boycott against the referendum. In short, the prospective constitutional amendment will deeply affect the political structure by furthering democracy and shaping political alignments in Turkey.